Discretionary Loan Loss Provisions And Earnings Management For The Banking Industry by Chang, Ruey-Dang et al.
International Business & Economics Research Journal – March 2008 Volume 7, Number 3 
 9 
Discretionary Loan Loss Provisions  
And Earnings Management  
For The Banking Industry 
Ruey-Dang Chang, (Email: raychang@mail.nsysu.edu.tw), National Sun Yat-Sen University, Taiwan   
Wen-Hua Shen, (Email: js1216@ms6.hinet.net), National Sun Yat-Sen University, Taiwan  
Chun-Ju Fang, (Email: fcj@thu.edu.tw), Tunghai University, Taiwan 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The purpose of the study is to investigate the relation between discretionary loan loss provisions 
and 6 indicators of bank operating performance for the period 1999-2004 under controlling the 
type of bank, ownership status and asset size. Besides, we investigate whether bank managers 
intend to use discretionary loan loss provisions as a means for earnings management. Based on 
the empirical results from the Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ) database, the study finds: (1) the 
two earnings-related variables, namely earnings before loan loss provisions and one-year-ahead 
earnings, are significantly related to discretionary loan loss provision; (2) non-performing loans is 
significantly related to discretionary loan loss provisions, but non-performing loans ratio and bad 
debts coverage ratio are not found to be significantly linked to discretionary loan loss provisions; 
(3) capital adequacy ratio is not significantly related to discretionary loan loss provisions. Finally, 
our findings indicate that bank managers may use discretionary loan loss provisions to engage in 
earnings management when the earnings before loan loss provisions or non-performing loans are 
at a high level.  
 
Keywords:  Earnings Management, Discretionary Loan Loss Provisions, Non- Performing Loans Ratio, Capital 
Adequacy Ratio 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
rior research generally concludes that managers engage in earnings management for many reasons and 
probably exercise their accounting discretion to influence reported earnings. First, they manipulate 
earnings because of capital market incentives, including implementing management buyouts plan, 
initial public offerings (IPO), seasoned equity offerings and mergers plan, to meet earnings forecasts or to smooth 
income, etc. Second, they implement earnings management because of contracts motivation (e.g. management 
compensation plans, debt agreement or job preservation). Third, they conduct earnings management due to 
regulation motivation, such as import regulation, industry regulation and antitrust law, etc. Regardless of whichever 
causes managers to manipulate earnings, the behavior of earnings management implies conflict of interest between 
managers, owners, and minority shareholders.  
 
The bank managers, like managers in other industries, have incentives to “adjust” earnings and maximize 
bank and/or manager’s wealth. The only difference is the method used to engage in earnings management. Unlike 
managers in other industries, bank managers usually utilize loan loss provisions to influence earnings reported. 
Collins et al. (1995) examine the impact of individual bank’s changing levels of capital, earnings and taxes on 
decisions to engage in some capital-raising options. They expect low levels of nondiscretionary current earnings will 
encourage managers to realize investment security gains as well as decrease loan loss provisions and conclude a 
positive relation between earnings and loan loss provisions. Shrieves and Dahl (2003) also indicate bank managers 
intend to realize short-term security gains or losses and utilize loan loss provisions to smooth earnings.  
 
Prior research documents that banks intend to execute transactions and manage accruals to achieve primary 
capital, tax, and earnings goals (Moyer, 1990; Scholes et al., 1990; Collins et al., 1995). In practice, banks’ managers 
may attempt to manipulate earnings and capital because of compensation plan and/or job preservation. Just like 
P 
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other industries, earnings (including tax consideration) is one of the most important indicator in performance 
measurement for bank managers. In addition to earnings, non-performing loan ratio and capital adequacy ratio 
(hereafter, capital ratio) are the other two key indices to measure manager’s performance. Hence, under 
compensation incentive and job preservation consideration, they will endeavor to improve earnings, raise capital 
ratio and keep non-performing loans ratio below standard level in order to meet their goals. Once they cannot reach 
the target, they may use accruals, loan loss provisions, loan charge-offs, realization of gains or losses of securities or 
miscellaneous gains and losses to “adjust” the figures of earnings, capital ratio and non-performing loans ratio. In 
practice, bank managers have discretionary powers to influence the level of loan loss provisions. Collins et al. (1995) 
and Anandarajan et al. (2007) find that the loan loss provisions are further used to manage earnings. Once bank 
managers raise the level of loan loss provisions, the second tier capital and capital ratio will increase through loan 
charge-offs process accordingly. In prior related studies, they employed discretionary loan loss provisions to 
examine earnings-smoothing motivation ( Kanagaretnam et al., 2003; Kanagaretnam et al., 2004), signal effect 
(Ahmed et al., 1999; Kanagaretnam et al., 2004; Eng and Nabar, 2007), the influence of bonus schemes on 
accounting decisions (McNichols and Wilson, 1988) or the motivation of capital management (Beatty et al., 1995; 
Ahmed et al., 1999). 
 
In order to examine whether bank mangers use discretionary loan loss provisions to adjust earnings, we 
first construct bad debts estimation model according to the model developed by McNichols and Wilson (1988). Then 
we view the regression residual as discretionary loan loss provisions estimation and use the estimated discretionary 
loan loss provisions as a proxy of earnings management. We conjecture (1) a significant positive relation between 
discretionary loan loss provisions and two earnings-related variables (i.e. earnings before loan loss provisions and 
one-year-ahead earnings); (2) a significant positive relation between discretionary loan loss provisions and three 
bad-debts-related variables (i.e. non-performing loans, non-performing loan ratio and bad debts coverage ratio). But 
we expect a negative relation between discretionary loan loss provisions and capital adequacy ratio.  
 
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents prior research and hypotheses 
development. In Section 3, we describe sample and data selection. Section 4 presents and discusses the results. Then 
we conclude this paper in Section 5. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
Prior Research 
 
Watts and Zimmerman (1978) assume that individuals act to maximize their own utility. So managers may 
lobby on accounting standards based on their own self-interest. They elaborate on the factors, namely, taxes, 
regulation, management compensation plans, bookkeeping cost and political costs, which are expected to affect 
firm’s cash flows. Among those factors, regulation (represents government intervention) may affect a firm 
investment-production decisions and cause a firm to manage its reported earnings. Schipper (1989) states earnings 
management as “disclosure management” in the sense of a purposeful intervention in the external financial reporting 
process, with the intent of obtaining some private gains. The statement of earnings management is based on a view 
of accounting numbers as information. It could occur in any part of the external disclosure process and could take a 
lot of forms.  
 
A large number of studies investigate managers’ decision for evidence of earnings management, including 
choice as to accounting methods, changes in methods, and accrual strategies (Healy, 1985; Dechow and Sloan, 1991; 
Lewellen et al., 1996; Bernard and Skinner, 1996). Healy and Wahlen (1999) indicate that “if financial reports are to 
convey managers’ information on their firms’ performance, standards must permit managers to exercise judgment in 
financial reporting.” It means that managers have the right to determine accounting methods, accrual choices and 
other accounting items which may influence reported earnings. Under accounting flexibility within GAAP, managers 
can use their private information and knowledge about the business to select reporting methods, estimates, and 
disclosures that can match their benefits.  
 
In addition to studies about accounting choices for firms in non-bank industries, several papers have 
examined managerial discretion in financial service firms with respect to loan loss provisions and the sale of 
investments (e.g., Moyer, 1990; Scholes et al., 1990; Collins et al., 1995; Beatty et al., 1995). They focus on 
discretionary behavior motivated by earnings, capital adequacy management, and tax management. But what do 
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bank managers exactly do to engage in earnings management? As literature documented, they may use accounting 
choices, timing of recognition of bad debts, sale of securities and / or discretionary accruals to influence reported 
earnings. For example, Clinch and Magliolo (1993) find bank managers may use discretionary behavior including 
the recognition of sales to influence earnings. Shrives and Dahl (2003) find that, under the Basel Accord, Japanese 
banks may exploit gains on securities sales and loan loss provisions to smooth reported earnings and replenish 
regulatory capital. Ahmed et al. (1999) find bank managers intend to use loan loss provisions for capital 
management. Additionally, they find negative relation between loan loss provisions and future earnings changes.  
 
Hypothesis Development 
 
Several studies suggest that the signaling incentive may play an important role in bank’s loan loss 
provisions decision (Griffin and Wallach, 1991; Liu, 1995). In practice, in order to reflect real status of loans and 
also comply with regulation, it is a necessary process for banks to recognize loan loss for potential uncollectible 
loans. Liu and Ryan (1995) suggest that bank managers have more discretion over loss provisions for large and 
frequently renegotiated loans, such as foreign and commercial loans, than for small or infrequently renegotiated 
loans, e.g. consumer loans, and find that market reaction to loan loss provisions is positive for banks with a high 
portion of large and frequently renegotiated loans. Besides, Elliot et al. (1991) and Wahlen (1994) find that market 
reacts positively to bank’s loan loss provisions announcements and unexpected loan loss provisions, respectively. As 
bank managers can arbitrarily decide the timeliness of loan loss provisions during the year, they can make use of 
loan loss provisions to influence reported earnings. Greenawalt and Sinkey (1988) find positive relationship between 
loan loss provisions and operating income before provision of loan losses and indicate that bank managers tend to 
engage in income smoothing behavior. When actual earnings are far lower (higher) than expected earnings, 
managers may make use of underestimating (overestimating) the amount of potential uncollectible loans on purpose 
and decrease (increase) the provision of loan losses in order to smooth earnings. Collins et al. (1995) document that 
heterogeneity among bank’s capital, earnings, and tax strategies is linked to size, growth and profitability. They find 
that profitable banks may use loan loss provisions to manage earnings. We hypothesize as follows: 
 
H1a:  Ceteris paribus, banks with higher earnings before loan loss provisions report relatively larger discretionary 
loan loss provisions.  
 
The provision of loan losses in the banking industry is primarily based on requirement of regulation in 
Taiwan. In accordance with relative regulations, bank managers must classify loans into five categories based on 
risk assessment, and then use the predetermined proportion to calculate the amount of the provision for potential 
loan losses per month. Ceteris paribus, once bank managers decide to raise the amount of loan loss provisions 
substantially in current year, it means that the amount of loan loss provisions possibly will decrease considerably 
and cause earnings improvement next year. Wahlen (1994) indicates that when future cash flow prospects improve, 
bank managers may raise the discretionary component of unexpected loan loss provisions. They find a positive 
relation between annual unexpected provisions and future changes in cash flows as far as three years ahead. Beaver 
and Engel (1996) adopt the concept of signaling motivation and follow Wahlen (1994) to incorporate one-year-ahead 
and two-year-ahead earnings in the model to estimate discretionary portion of the allowance account. They view 
discretionary allowance as a signal for better future earnings and expect a positive relation between them. But 
Ahmed et al. (1999) provide no evidence of earnings management through loan loss provisions. They find that loan 
loss provisions are negatively related to both future earnings changes and contemporaneous stock returns. As the 
literature provides different results about the relation between loan loss provisions and future earnings, we test the 
relation between year-ahead-earnings and loan loss provisions and expect that higher year-ahead-earnings are 
associated with high level of loan loss provisions in current year. We hypothesize as follows: 
 
H1b:  Ceteris paribus, banks with higher year-ahead-earnings report relatively larger discretionary loan loss 
provisions. 
 
According to the Basel Capital Accord, the capital ratio is calculated using the definition of regulatory 
capital and risk-weighted assets and used by regulators to measure bank capital adequacy. The capital ratio must be 
no lower than 8% (Collins et al., 1995; Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2004). One of the purposes for 
banks to manage capital is to maintain the capital ratio above the minimum of 8%. The authorities will limit the 
bank’s activities when its capital ratio can’t reach the minimum requirement. Accordingly, inadequate capital ratio 
will bring banks unnecessary controlling costs. Moyer (1990) finds that bank managers intend to select accounting 
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procedures to raise capital ratio to avoid additional controlling costs. Beatty et al. (1995) provide evidence of 
negative relation between loan loss provisions and capital ratio. Collins et al. (1995) expect that the calculation of 
the primary capital ratio indicates capital is augmented by increasing the loan loss provisions and/or decreasing loan 
charge-offs, but empirically find banks with low capital appear to decrease discretionary loan loss provisions for 
capital ratio consideration. As capital ratio plays an important role as an indicator to reflect the risk status of the 
bank, it indicates bank’s abilities to survive under current capital structure and implies the invisible risk of default. 
Lin and Chen (1997) refer to the study of Liu (1985) and indicate banks with inadequate capital ratio may use 
discretionary loan loss provisions to augment capital ratio. Although Ahemd et al. (1999) suggest that after 
implementing the new Basel Capital Accord, the negative relation between loan loss provisions and capital 
management has decreased. Chen (2002) documents that commercial banks in Taiwan still exploit loan loss 
provisions to influence capital and raise capital ratio. As prior studies have examined the behavior of capital 
management using loan loss provisions, we test whether banks with higher capital ratio report less discretionary loan 
loss provisions and hypothesize as follows: 
 
H2:  Ceteris paribus, banks with higher capital ratio report relatively larger discretionary loan loss provisions. 
 
According to the regulations in Taiwan, non-performing loans mainly refer to all loans in the portfolio more 
than 3 months overdue on interest or principal payments, or the loans less than 3 months overdue but banks sued 
debtors for default already, or took legal action to disposal collateral. Under the pressure from authorities and market, 
bank managers may be forced to increase the provision of loan losses. Once managers increase discretionary loan 
loss provisions, the other performance indicators, such as earnings, non-performing loans ratio and capital ratio, will 
be impacted. Therefore, when bank managers decide to increase discretionary loan loss provisions this year and then 
write off the uncollectible loan accordingly, it will cause decreasing in both earnings and non-performing loans ratio 
at the same time. When the earnings after loan loss provisions still remain positive, the loan charge-offs will reduce 
the amount of risk-weighted assets in portfolio, then enhance the capital ratio. On the contrary, when loan loss 
provisions cause a large number of losses in net income, it will cause the decrease of both capital and risk-weighted 
assets simultaneously and lower capital ratio if the magnitude of the reduction in capital is more than risk-weighted. 
Similarly, when bank managers implement loan loss provisions according to real risk status and the rules of relative 
regulation completely, the discretionary loan loss provisions will approach zero, and won’t affect earnings, 
non-performing loans ratio and capital ratio anymore. 
 
In view of the long-term performance, bank managers may prefer to increase discretionary loan loss 
provisions in order to improve the quality of assets and lower the non-performing loans ratio in the future. They may 
sacrifice earnings this year to exchange for better performance next year, if they expect that it is unable to achieve 
the goals this year. But in view of the short performance, bank managers may be compelled to decrease loan loss 
provisions because of compensation plans and job preservation motivation. Namely, it will overstate reported 
earnings or understate negative net income. Therefore, the magnitude of discretionary loan loss provision may be 
affected by some key indicators with respect to performance measurement. We expect the amount and ratio of 
non-performing loans may influence managers’ will to increase or decrease discretionary loan loss provisions. 
Therefore, we hypothesize as follows: 
 
H3a:  Ceteris paribus, banks with higher non-performing loans report relatively larger discretionary loan loss 
provisions. 
H3b:  Ceteris paribus, banks with higher non-performing loans ratio report relatively larger discretionary loan loss 
provisions. 
 
The level of non-performing loans ratio indicates the general quality of loans portfolio. The downward 
trend in non-performing loans ratio means the quality of total loans has been improving and vice versa. As 
non-performing loans ratio is calculated by dividing non-performing loans by total loans, high non-performing loans 
ratio means that a relatively large number of interests and principals will be uncollectible. Other than 
non-performing loans ratio, another ratio, namely bad debts coverage ratio, indicates the proportion of allowance for 
bad debts in potential uncollectible loans. When the bad debts coverage ratio reaches 100%, it means that the bank 
has already prepared for all the potential uncollectible loans. Once the potential uncollectible loans have been 
confirmed as “real” bad debts, banks will accordingly write off the bad debts. As the level of bad debts coverage 
ratio represents bank managers’ attitude to risk, banks with higher bad debts coverage ratio may remain same 
policies on potential uncollectible loans. Therefore, the hypothesis is established as follows: 
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H3c:  Ceteris paribus, banks with higher bad debts coverage ratio report relatively larger discretionary loan loss 
provisions. 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
A large number of papers examine managers’ accrual choice to detect earnings management (Healy, 1985; 
Bernard and Skinner, 1996). The goal of discretionary accrual models is to separate total accruals (hereafter, TA) 
into discretionary and nondiscretionary components. Because discretionary accruals (hereafter, DA) are 
unobservable, we follow McNichols and Wilson (1988) and use proxy (DAE) to measure DA with error (η), 
whereηis assumed to be white noise. As DAE equals to TA deducting an estimate of nondiscretionary accruals 
(NDAE), ηrepresents the deviation between NDA and NDAE. Due to the positive relation betweenηand DAP, 
researchers useηas DA’s surrogate. Therefore, we use the residual of loan loss provisions model to estimate 
discretionary loan loss provisions. 
 
Sample Selection 
 
Our data come from TEJ (Taiwan Economic Journal) which contains various data of public companies 
listed in the Taiwan Stock Exchange. We select 1999 through 2004 as the period of analysis and obtain 164 
firm-year observations. The empirical analysis involves a two-step procedure. First, the provision of loan losses is 
modeled as a linear function of loan charge-offs and beginning balance of allowance for bad debts. The estimated 
residuals from the first-stage regression provide the estimate of discretionary loan loss provisions used in the second 
stage as dependable variable. 
 
Model of Loan Loss Provisions  
 
We estimate loan loss provisions with a set of variables including loan charge-offs and beginning balance 
of allowance for bad debts. McNichols and Wilson (1988) use estimated residuals of bad debts regression model as a 
surrogate of discretionary accruals. Loan loss provisions equal to the sum of the ending balance of allowance for bad 
debts and loan charge-offs, then deducting the beginning balance of allowance for bad debts. In practice, most bank 
managers decide the amount of loan loss provisions every month according to individual risk assessment on 
potential uncollectible loans and loans write-offs. Accordingly, we use the following regression to estimate loan loss 
provisions, and treat regression residuals as discretionary loan loss provisions: 
 
LLPt = β0 + β1COt + β2B_BALt+ εt                                             (1) 
 
Where: 
 
LLPt : loan loss provisions in year t 
COt : loan charge-offs in year t 
B_BALt: the beginning balance of allowance for bad debts 
εt: residuals 
t: year 
 
Model Of Discretionary Loan Loss Provisions  
 
Since discretionary loan loss provisions cannot be directly observed, it is estimated by regressing loan loss 
provisions on the explanatory variables in Eq. (1). The residual from Eq.(1) is taken to be an estimate of 
discretionary loan loss provisions. We regress the explanatory variables, namely earnings before loan loss provisions, 
one-year-ahead earnings, non-performing loans, non-performing loans ratio and bad debts coverage ratio, and test 
our hypotheses by estimating the coefficients in the following model. 
 
DLLPt=γ0+γ1GOVERNt+γ2CATAt +γ3lnASSET+ γ4BP_EARNt+γ5EARNt+1+γ6BISt+γ7 R_NPLt t+γ8NPLt 
+γ9R_COVERt+εt                                                      (2) 
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Where:   
 
DLLPt: discretionary loan loss provisions in year t  
GOVERNt: an indicator variable equal to 1 when the bank’s ownership is controlled mainly by government and 0 
otherwise  
CATAt: an indicator variable equal to 1 when the bank is classified as a commercial bank and 0 otherwise 
lnASSETt: natural logarithm of total assets at the end of year t 
BP_EARNt: earnings before loan loss provisions at the end of the year 
EARNt+1: one-year-ahead earnings, i.e. earnings in year t+1 
BISt: capital ratio at the end of year t 
NPLt: total non-performing loans in year t 
R_NPLt: non-performing loans ratio at the end of year t 
R_COVERt: bad debts coverage ratio (i.e. loan loss provisions at the end of year t over total non-performing loans) 
t: year 
 
We follow Wahlen (1994), Collins et al. (1995), Ahmed et al. (1999) and Kanagaretnam et al. (2004) using 
discretionary loan loss provisions as response variable to test our hypotheses. The five explanatory variables in 
Eq.(2), namely BP_EARNt, EARNt+1, NPLt, R_NPLt, and R_COVERt are added to the model to test our hypotheses. 
BP_EARNt equals to bank’s earnings before loan loss provisions at the end of the year. We calculate BP_EARN t by 
summing the provisions of loan losses and earnings before taxes, and divide loan loss provisions at the end of the 
year by total non-performing loans to compute R_COVERt. As to EARNt+1, NPLt and R_NPLt, they are collected 
directly from TEJ database.  
 
In addition, we include several factors that are likely to affect bank managers’ discretionary loan loss 
provisions. First, the bigger the company is, the larger the agency problem may be (Gabor, 1985). The natural 
logarithm of total assets (lnASSETt) is included because large banks have more resources as well as abilities to 
make profits and hence are more likely to avoid using discretionary loan loss provisions to manipulate earnings. 
Second, Betty et al. (2002) find that publicly listed banks may use discretionary loan loss provisions and realization 
of securities gains to avoid earnings decrease. It implies that the ownership structure may influence managers’ 
behavior of loan loss provisions. We indicate GOVERNt as 1 if the government is the controlling owner of the bank 
and has the right to nominate the chairman of board, and 0 otherwise. Finally, As the type of bank exhibits different 
business activities and assets portfolio, we include CATAt, an indicator variable equal to 1 if the bank is classified to 
the group of commercial banks and 0 otherwise, in Eq.(2). 
 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
Descriptive Statistics For Sample 
 
Table 1 presents sample distribution according to year, CATAt and GOVERNt. Our sample firms report that 
the state-owned banks and non-state-owned banks are about 30% and 70% respectively. Approximately 76% of the 
sample banks belong to the group of commercial banks. Table 2 shows that 64% of the sample are non-state-owned 
commercial banks and 12% are state-owned commercial banks. 
 
 
Table1: Sample Distribution 
 
Year 
Owner Status 
Total 
Type 
Total State- 
Owned 
Non- 
State-Owned 
Commercial 
Banks 
Other Banks 
1999 0 3 3 3 0 3 
2000 9 24 33 26 7 33 
2001 10 23 33 25 8 33 
2002 10 23 33 25 8 33 
2003 10 21 31 23 8 31 
2004 10 21 31 23 8 31 
Total 49 115 164 125 39 164 
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Table 2: Sample Classification 
 
Owner Status 
Commercial Banks 
 (%) 
Non-Commercial Bank (%) Total 
Non-State-Owned 105 (64%) 10 (6%) 115 (70%) 
State-Owned 20 (12%) 29 (18%) 49 (30%) 
Total 125 (76%) 39 (24%) 164 (100%) 
 
 
Regression Result  
 
First, we incorporate those potential decision-influencing factors
1
 documented in prior research in the 
regression model. We check scatter plot and coefficient significance of each variable, and finally select both loan 
charge-offs and the beginning balance of allowance for bad debts as explanatory variables to estimate the bank’s 
provision of loan losses. Table 3 reports the descriptive statistics of loan loss provisions (LLPt), the beginning 
balance of allowance for bad debts (B_BALt) and loan charge-offs (COt). 
 
 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of the Variables in Eq.(1) 
 
 Sample Size Minimum Maximum Mean S.D. 
LLPt 164 -0.7 52.41 5.31 7.48 
B_BALt 164 0.11 21.19 4.29 3.76 
COt 164 0.00 52.57 5.67 7.67 
LLPt : loan loss provisions in year t                                                  units: NT$100 millions  
B_BALt: beginning balance of allowance for bad debts in year t 
COt : loan charge-offs in year t 
 
 
In Table 3, the standard deviation of those variables, especially for LLPt and COt, is relatively large compared 
with mean. It exhibits a substantial divergence between banks’ behavior of loan loss provisions and loan charge-offs 
and implies different level of pressure born by every individual bank. Table 4 represents the correlation between 
variables. 
 
 
Table 4: Correlation Coefficient between Variables in Eq.(1) 
 
Variables LLPt B_BALt COt 
LLPt 1.000   
B_BALt 0.567
*** 1.000  
COt 0.973
*** 0.633*** 1.000 
*** Significant at the 1% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; * Significant at the 10% level 
See Table 3 for variable definitions. 
 
 
In Table 4, we find that the correlation coefficient between LLPt and COt is 0.973 (p<0.01) and the correlation 
between LLPt and B_BALt is 0.567 (p<0.01). It indicates that both B_BALt and COt may influence LLPt. Table 5 is 
the regression result of Eq.(1). If we use COt as the only explanatory variable to LLPt. The R square of Eq.(1) is 
about 0.946. After adding the B_BALt, the adjusted R square of Eq.(1) increases to 0.950. The coefficient of COt 
and B_BALt is 1.000 (p<0.01) and -0.164 (p<0.01), respectively. It implies that with one unit of loan charge-offs, 
bank managers will replenish the allowance for bad debts to the original amount before loan charge-offs. In addition, 
the coefficient of B_BALt is negative (-0.164) which indicates that one unit increase of B_BALt will cause LLPt to 
decrease 0.164 units.  
 
In practice, banks in Taiwan are required by regulation to classify assets to five categories based on risk 
assessment. Bank managers must follow the regulations to accomplish loan loss provisions every year accordingly. 
As we can see in Table 5, one unit of increase in COt will cause one unit of increase in LLPt. It implies that bank 
                                                 
1 We use the factors including the beginning balance of allowance for bad debts, loan charge-offs, the ending balance of  
allowance for bad debts, loan charge-offs in previous year, total uncollectible loans, interest receivable, total amount of credit 
loans, loan loss provisions in the previous year and assets 
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managers intend to maintain same level of loan loss provisions during our sample period. The difference between 
the actual provision of loan losses and expected provision according to the specific provision proportion on potential 
uncollectible loans (grouping by risk assessment) is what we call “discretionary loan loss provisions”.    
 
 
Table 5: Regressing Results of Eq.(1)  
 
Variables Estimated coefficient t-value p-value 
Constant 0.339 1.709 0.089 
B_BALt -0.164 -3.645 0.000
*** 
COt 1.000 45.282 0.000
*** 
    
Sample size 164   
F-value 1,548   
Adjusted R2 0.950   
*** Significant at the 1% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; * Significant at the 10% level 
See Table 3 for variable definitions. 
 
 
Besides, the Durbin-Watson test shows the statistic D is 1.897. To avoid potential autocorrelation, we use the 
Cochrane-Orutt procedure to eliminate the problem of autocorrelated errors. Table 6 shows that the regression result 
of Eq.(1) has no autocorrelation problem. If bank managers intend to raise earnings, they may underestimate the risk 
of specific loans and lift up the rating of potential uncollectible loans in order to decrease the provision of loan 
losses. 
 
 
Table 6: The Regressing Result of Eq.(1) under the Cochrane-Orutt Procedure 
 
Variables Estimated coefficient t-value p-value 
Constant 0.362 1.842 0.067 
B_BALt -0.183 -3.979 0.000
*** 
COt 1.004 45.514 0.000
*** 
    
Sample size 163   
F-value 1,523   
Adjusted R2 0.949   
*** Significant at the 1% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; * Significant at the 10% level 
See Table 3 for variable definitions. 
 
 
Hypothesis Tests 
 
We use the result in Table 6 to calculate the residual as the surrogate of discretionary loan loss provisions. 
Incorporating ownership status (GOVERNt), the type of bank (CATAt) and bank size (lnASSETt) into Eq.(2) as 
control variables, we use earnings before loan loss provisions at the end of the year (BP_EARN t), one-year-ahead 
earnings (EARNt+1), capital ratio at the end of the year (BISt), total non-performing loans (NPLt), non-performing 
loans ratio at the end of the year (R_NPLt) and bad debts coverage ratio (R_COVERt) as explanatory variables to 
test our hypotheses.  
 
Table 7 exhibits the descriptive statistic of explanatory variables as well as control variables on Eq.(2). The 
standard deviation of BP_EARNt, EARNt+1 and NPLt is 7.12, 7.59 and 19.62. But the mean of those variables is 6.21, 
0.80 and 17.17, respectively. It implies a substantial divergence in earnings performance and non-performing loans 
between banks. Table 8 shows the regression results of Eq.(2). 
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Table 7: Descriptive Statistic of variables in Eq. (2) 
 
Variables Sample Size Minimum Maximum Mean S.D 
DLLPt 130 -7.18 8.51 0.20 1.63 
lnASSETt 130 3.73 7.60 5.83 0.82 
BP_EARNt 130 -20.41 32.50 6.21 7.12 
EARNt+1) 130 -36.82 17.67 0.80 7.59 
BISt 130 1.04 19.77 10.31 2.38 
R_NPLt 130 0.82 30.25 5.95 4.89 
NPLt 130 0.29 95.51 17.17 19.62 
R_COVERt 130 0.09 7.68 0.39 0.67 
      
Sample Size 130     
*** Significant at the 1% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; * Significant at the 10% level 
DLLPt: discretionary loan loss provisions in year t  
lnASSETt: natural logarithm of total assets at the end of the year 
BP_EARNt: earnings before loan loss provisions at the end of the year 
EARNt+1: one-year-ahead earnings 
BISt: capital ratio at the end of year t 
NPLt: total non-performing loans in year t 
R_NPLt: non-performing loans ratio at the end of year t 
R_COVERt: bad debts coverage ratio in year t (i.e. loan loss provisions at the end of the year over total non-performing loans) 
 
 
Table 8: Regressing Results of Eq.(2)  
 
Variables 
Estimated 
coefficient 
Standardized 
coefficient 
t p value VIF 
Constant 7.147 - 2.749 0.007*** - 
GOVERNt -0.571 -0.161 -1.005 0.317 4.829 
CATAt 0.582 0.153 1.267 0.208 2.425 
lnASSETt -1.539 -0.771 -3.544 0.001
*** 7.876 
BP_EARNt 0.086 0.377 3.112 0.002
*** 2.440 
EARNt+1 0.063 0.293 2.703 0.008
*** 1.953 
BISt 0.044 0.064 0.703 0.484 1.374 
R_NPLt -0.018 -0.053 -0.421 0.674 2.665 
NPLt 0.062 0.748 3.923 0.000
*** 6.041 
R_COVERt -0.044 -0.018 -0.227 0.821 1.086 
      
Sample Size 130     
F-value 5.133     
Adjusted R2 0.224     
*** Significant at the 1% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; * Significant at the 10% level 
GOVERNt: an indicator variable equal to 1 when the bank’s ownership is controlled mainly by government and 0 otherwise  
CATAt: an indicator variable equal to 1 when the bank is classified as a commercial bank and 0 otherwise 
See Table 7 for definitions of other variables. 
 
 
In Table 8, the variance inflation factor (VIF) for all variables is all smaller than 10, therefore, the 
multicollinearity between variables is not serious. The coefficient of BP_EARNt (0.086, p<0.01) indicates positive 
relation between earnings before loan loss provisions and discretionary loan loss provisions. It suggests that bank 
managers intend to raise the provision of loan losses to write off bad debts as well as reduce the non-performing 
loans ratio. The coefficient of EARNt+1 (0.063, p<0.01) means positive relation between one-year-ahead earnings 
and discretionary loan loss provisions. It suggests that managers may use discretionary loan loss provisions to lift 
one-year-ahead earnings up intentionally. Finally, the coefficient of NPLt (0.062, p< 0.01) shows positive relation 
between non-performing loans and discretionary loan loss provisions. It suggests when the amount of 
non-performing loans increases, bank managers may increase the provisions of loan losses in order to reduce the 
non-performing loans ratio. We conclude that the hypotheses H1a, H1b and H3b are supported. As for H2, H3a and H3b, 
the coefficients on BISt, R_NPLt and R_COVERt are insignificant at conventional levels. Thus, the results in Table 8 
do not support the hypotheses H2, H3a and H3b. 
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As for the other control variables, the coefficient of lnASSETt (-1.539, p<0.01) indicates that the larger the 
bank is, the smaller the discretionary loan loss provisions are. But our results do not find significant evidence about 
the influence of both GOVERNt and CATAt on discretionary loan loss provisions. 
 
Analysis On Earnings Management  
 
The deviation between the actual provisions of loan losses and the estimated loan loss provisions calculated 
by regression Eq.(2) represents the discretionary loan loss provisions. No matter what the sign of the discretionary 
loan loss provision is, we use the absolute value of the deviation as a surrogate of earnings management. We further 
divide the sample into two groups according to the mean of the absolute value of DLLP t and each explanatory 
variable respectively. Table 9 exhibits the results of the t-test. 
 
 
Table 9: Results of the t-test for ABS(DLLPt) and Explanatory Variables  
 
Variables Group Mean of ABS(DLLPt) p value 
BP_EARNt 
High 1.8303 0.000*** 
Low 0.6239  
EARNt+1 
High 1.1398 0.194 
Low 0.8394  
BISt 
High 1.0652 0.692 
Low 0.9838  
R_NPLt 
High 1.2734 0.112 
Low 0.9210  
NPLt 
High 1.7319 0.000*** 
Low 0.7624  
R_COVERt 
High 1.2004 0.232 
Low 0.9417  
*** Significant at the 1% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; * Significant at the 10% level 
ABS(DLLPt): the absolute value of the earnings before loan loss provisions in year t 
See Table 7 for the definitions of other variables. 
 
 
Our findings in Table 9 indicate that the means of ABS(DLLPt) in high BP_EARNt group and in high NPLt 
group are larger than those in low BP_EARNt group and in low NPLt group. Namely, bank managers intend to use 
discretionary loan loss provisions to influence reported earnings when they have high earnings before loan loss 
provisions or high non-performing loans.  
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
Prior studies about loan loss provisions mainly focus on the effects of discretionary loan losses provisions 
on earnings management, capital management, taxes management and stock return. We use financial data of the 
Taiwanese banks through the period of 1999-2004 to investigate the factors which may affect the discretionary 
provision of loan losses. Our findings provide evidence of a positive link between discretionary loan loss provisions 
and the earnings before loan loss provisions, as well as one-year-ahead earnings and non-performing loans. When 
the earnings before loan loss provisions increase, bank mangers may increase discretionary loan loss provisions so 
as to alleviate the pressure of high non-performing loans ratios. Under the same consideration, bank managers may 
raise the discretionary loan loss provisions when non-performing loans are at a high level. Besides, when the 
one-year-ahead earnings increase, it may be caused at the expense of current year’s earnings. But we do not find 
evidence on the relation between discretionary loan loss provisions and capital ratio, non-performing loans ratio and 
the bad debts coverage ratio. 
 
Finally, our findings indicate a positive relation between the absolute value of discretionary loan loss 
provisions and the earnings before loan loss provisions, as well as non-performing loans. This suggests that banks 
with high earnings before loan loss provisions and high non-performing loans may intend to increase or decrease 
discretionary loan loss provisions for the purpose of earnings management.  
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